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Abstract 
The relationship between ethics and economics in the modern age is typically viewed as 
external. This view is most usually articulated in the notion that for economic relations to be 
ethical, an ethic must be imposed; otherwise, economic relations are amoral. I try to show how 
the relationship is actually best explained by adopting an explanatory framework of inter-
dependent arising, according to which the emergence and development of both ethical and eco-
nomic relations is a matter of mutual determination. Ethical values emerge in the course of de-
veloping economic relations and, in turn direct or at least implicate economic relations. The con-
sequences of a such a view, however, are that exchange values inform moral concepts (e.g., of 
what is morally owed to members of a community) and moral concepts help frame economic 
ones. 
I offer an argument that starts with a description of a historical relationship between two 
disparate cultures (English and Iroquoian). The interactions between these cultures were deter-
mined initially by trade and then military interests. These interests eventually underwent pressure 
to evolve into legal and even religiously informed arrangements that necessarily involved certain 
moral values. Using a presupposition analysis, I show how this evolution was no accident and 
did not depend on some agent(s) imposing the moral values onto the relationship. Rather, those 
values arose as a matter of course. In conclusion, the paper advances the idea that, since the rela-
tionship between ethics and economics is internal, the ethics of economic relations needs to be 




Recognizing the Embeddedness of Ethics and Economics 
 
Introduction 
Does an attempt to re-embed ethics and economics make sense? If so, what approach 
makes most sense? In an age that is attempting and seemingly failing to re-attach disciplines, 
practices, modes of understanding, sectors, all of which have been rendered apart by modernist 
forces, the task may seem futile. Detachment, insularity, isolation, separation and specialized 
study are today’s norm, despite the many calls to develop holistic views of life and approaches to 
managing human affairs, because modernist forces and values remain deeply entrenched in our 
way of thinking; the attraction of modern values – clarity and precision of analysis and the focus 
on efficiency of decision-making – support and perhaps even demand a disembedding 
(detaching) of economics and ethics. Further, it is not difficult to generate mistrust of holistic 
approaches (e.g., via accusations of fuzziness and fascistic intent [see Marietta]). The approach 
to the idea of re-embedding ethics and economics, for this paper, is heavily influenced by these 
considerations. It is to show how ethics and economics are in fact mutually embedded, despite all 
our reasons for thinking they are not and ought not be. The primary aim is to challenge certain 
core beliefs about the nature of both economics and ethics. A second aim is to show how the no-
tion of inter-dependent arising best describes the emerging of the relationship. If successful, it 
will tell us that the first task of economists and ethicists is to re-conceive their relationship, with 
the aim of avoiding error and correcting perversions of the fundamental relationship. 
The separation of ethics and economics might be said to have had its greatest impetus 
during the modern era. David Hume’s disclosure of the fact/value distinction and related separa-
tions of church/state/, reason/faith, description/prescription, have influenced the detaching of eth-
ics (a normative discipline) and economics (a descriptive, scientific discipline) and helped define 
that relationship as an external one. The great achievements of Modernity – the protection of the 
individual from arbitrary state and church rule, the protection of the private sphere, the wealth 
generated by free enterprise and freeing of governance structures and cetera – became powerful 
reasons to accept the separating of the once embedded elements that constituted society: it helped 
diminish oppressiveness, gave more people more freedom to acquire, enjoy social mobility and 
choose destinies. Fundamental to this kind of freedom is the ability to assign or confer value onto 
anything in any way one chooses, since one’s values are matters of the private sphere. The con-
nection between this kind of freedom and the free-enterprise market economy is close. Allowing 
the market to regulate itself without impositional moralistic interference connects powerfully to 
the human desire for autonomy and privacy. Since it is difficult to imagine people wanting to 
abandon these freedoms and values, proposing a re-embedding of economics and ethics can seem 
a major step backwards into more oppressive times. 
 
So, if there is to be re-embedding of ethics and economics, it is not likely to be owing to 
people willing to forgo freedoms and abandon related values. In my view, it will only occur as a 
result of identifying a mistake in the separation thesis. But where could this mistake lie? Since, in 
answering this question, I have a potential policy and decision-making audience in mind, I will 
begin, not by proposing an alternative framework, such as one derived from an analysis of oikos 
or by adopting a holistic approach, but by tracking down this mistake. To do so, I examine an 
actual economic relationship from its beginning, in order to disclose how that relationship devel-
oped and how ethical considerations enters the story. The question, “Was the emergence of ethi-
cal factors external to the economic development, or was it internal?”, focuses attention on where 
the mistake is committed, by focusing on the process whereby the relationship came to be guided 
and even governed by moral concepts and principles. By examining how these concepts and 
principles came to be relevant, it is possible to determine whether they were imposed, or 
emerged as a matter of course. While considering the evidence, I will keep in mind a two-
pronged critique: that economic interests are ultimately governed by hedonistic calculations; that, 
unless otherwise demonstrated, evidence of moral values at work is not evidence of an internal 
relationship, but derives from some world foreign to the economic one. 
I begin with an examination of an economic relationship, which is readily assumed to 
have been based purely on utility, so that the starting point is clear and non-question-begging. In 
fact, the moral factors that seem to have arisen in that relationship have been viewed either as 
trivial [Washburn/Trigger], or, at best, something forcefully imposed onto economic relations by 
people who had the power to do so. That relationship is described in the early North American 
colonial records that describe First Nation/British Crown treaty interactions and agreements. 
During a meeting between the Five Nations (also known as the Iroquois) and the British Colonel 
Schuyler (Albany, 19 July, 1712) , the Aboriginal partners said, “Thus (say they) our first enter-
ing into a Coven’t with you was Chiefly grounded upon Trade.” Time after time, the records in-
dicate how various sachems and intelligence agents for the British Crown announced the need 
for cheap goods and fair trade. So, there is no doubt that economic (trade) interests clearly initi-
ated and initially defined the relationship. When direct evidence of moral directives can be 
found, it appears in relation to certain figures who were viewed as particularly fair and honest or 
when certain people forced trade relations to comply with moral norms (e.g., clergy or more de-
vout religious men insisting that alcohol is not to be used to manipulate First Nations into signing 
deeds to land). 
As the relationship developed, these trading partners became military allies to combat the 
alliance between the French and mostly Algonquian speaking peoples to the north of the Iro-
quois. As these trade and military alliances developed into treaty relations, the relationship be-
came a negotiation forum, a forum for establishing formal agreements, a complaint hearing fo-
rum and a place to settle disputes. So, by all counts, it was a relationship in which both sides got 
what they could from it; it appears to have been based purely on utility calculations. However, 
over time, it began to take on characteristics of a legal arrangement (regarding fairness in trade 
relations, conflict resolution, punishments for murder etc.). In this development the records begin 
showing how these trading partners and allies began accusing one another of being untrust-
worthy, lacking in courage and fidelity, undependable, unjust, among a number of others. [a 
quote is possible here] Obviously, trustworthiness, courage etcetera, had become part of the set 
of expectations these partners had of one another. 
Were these normative principles imposed? If so, by whom would they have been im-
posed? Certainly, it was not one side imposing these principles on the other, since the alliance 
was based on mutual advantage. And there is no evidence that both sides came to a mutual agree-
ment to impose such principles. One of the first things to note is that, as each side invested more 
into the relationship (e.g., military resources, legal resources), more became at stake, which is 
evident in situations where one partner threatened to leave the relationship. Former partners 
could then potentially establish trade and military alliances with enemy nations. Establishing ro-
bust, stable and orderly relations, then, became a priority, which generated a further interest in 
satisfying their partner. 
 
In any but the crudest, one-time trade interactions, trading partners become interested in 
the future of their relationship, orienting themselves toward the possible turns the relationship 
could take. Both sides in the Covenant Chain relationship wanted to maintain the benefits of 
trade and to give their current partners no reason to begin trading or allying with enemy nations. 
Both European and Aboriginal partners began, as a consequence, to judge one another with re-
spect to their dispositional orientations; whether their partners were reliable, prone to fickle,  
cowardly, honest and trustworthy. It is not difficult to see why trade-based relations that move 
beyond the crudest one time interactions must transform into ones that incorporate new interests 
and involve different kinds of judgments. These new interests can be articulated in terms of val-
ues, some of which are normative and which change the orientation of their holders toward their 
trading partners. They begin observing and judging their partners in terms of their reputation and 
histories. The dynamics of the relationship change, as result, because accountability, praise and 
blame, accusation and defence become part of its governance. These interests become more evi-
dent when we read about threats of withdrawal. Such threats were used to gain the compliance to 
expectation from the partner. They resulted from the failure of one side to satisfy expectations. In 
its defence, the accused would defend its reputation and often reciprocate with counter accusa-
tions to balance the force of the initial accusation. 
This kind of reciprocation evokes acts of reflection that make accused parties recognize 
that they must be able to defend their reputation as reliable etc. An orientation and logic of recip-
rocity emerges to shape the ways in which each party is obliged to reflect on its own actions and 
to communicate its interests in ways that are consistent with the expectations generated in the 
history of the relationship. Each party begins to understand that, while it expects trustworthiness, 
courage and the like from their partner, their partner also expects it from them. An exchange of 
recognition and of normatively right actions, then, becomes part of a more comprehensive econ-
omy of exchange. 
Where normative values come to be reciprocated, the resulting relationship can be called 
a ‘moral economy,’ according to which people engage in exchanges, often implicit and hidden, 
based on such normative features such as trust, dependability, fairness and even-mindedness. In 
this way, an economy of norm-oriented values emerges as a consequence of trading partners tak-
ing a future orientation toward the relationship and having to think reflectively about their own 
and their partners’ dispositions, histories and, indeed, openness to reciprocity. 
 
This future oriented trade context presupposes a community of interlocutors who can rec-
ognize one another as having abilities to calculate, form intentions, choose, make judgments and 
form expectations of one another. These factors, among others, constitute a framework or eco-
nomic culture that affects the ordering of the relationship, in accordance with distinctions be-
tween suitable/unsuitable, trustworthy/untrustworthy, acceptable/unacceptable. These distinc-
tions are indicative of directives (indicating how interlocutors should and must not act), which, in 
turn, transforms the community into a more complex system of exchange than it initially was. In 
this way, normative values emerge from holding economic values and emerge as a matter of de-
velopmental/evolutionary course. I prefer the use of the term ‘evolution,’ because it implies a 
process of adaptation to conditions and forces that might not have been anticipatable at the be-
ginning of a relationship. If these normative values are not moral values straightway, because 
they are not articulated as principles, they are at least proto-moral values, in the sense that they 
create an implicit frame of reference that includes judgments about how the relationship ought to 
be governed and how interlocutors ought to behave and communicate. The idea of violation, as-
sociated with dessert, punishment, retaliation, gives these new values the character of a moral 
imperative. If this analysis has been able to show that the identified norms are really only proto-
moral norms, the only thing remaining to make them actual moral values is an explicit formula-
tion, as moral virtues (e.g., honesty) and principles (e.g., justice). This making explicit occurred 
quite rapidly in the course of the Covenant Chain’s evolution. 
The point of using the term, ‘evolution,’ is to emphasize the internality of the moral 
norm/economic interest relationship. Moral values and norms evolve in response to adaptive 
needs that arise as a result of relationships becoming more complex, which, in turn arises as a 
consequence of taking a future orientation toward self-interest. To advance this initial analysis, 
we can examine how the relationship between interlocutors itself became a matter of concern. 
The relationship did not remain simply a vehicle for the individual interlocutors to get what they 
wanted. 
A future oriented trade relationship, as described thus far (not necessarily one that has 
become much more complex), creates a situation in which reciprocity generates identifications as 
insiders and outsiders. Insiders satisfy certain criteria (e.g., they have engaged in reciprocal rela-
tions through exchanging commodities, trust etc.). Those who have not so reciprocated remain 
outside the relationship. This relationship is an intentional grouping, in the sense that it is formed 
of a limited number of interlocutors who recognize one another’s acts of reciprocation. It can 
also be intentionally dissolved (e.g., if person A feels betrayed by Person B, or reciprocity ends). 
Where such intentional communities survive, the interlocutors gain a sense of belonging. 
This sense of belonging is perhaps best illustrated in cases where a partner begins to feel 
threatened by a third party who either attempts to begin trade relations with Person A or who 
threatens to destroy the relationship altogether. This threat makes explicit to one or both partners 
the fact that the relationship (not just the particular interests) is something that involves commit-
ment, not just to trade, but to the values that make an ongoing trade relationship possible. For 
instance, once trust is exercised and demonstrated (exchanged), even if one partner loses her 
source of trade goods, her partner can still be expected to commit to re-establishing her trading 
ability, rather than simply abandoning her to her own devices. In part, this is a consequence of 
the nature of trust; it is something that informs and transforms a relationship into one that carries 
new expectations of loyalty. In this way, the relationship, in itself, becomes something to be pro-
tected. Even if some in the relationship remain purely calculative with respect to their self-
interest, they can see the value of those who maintain the relationship as a whole, because they 
can then continue to exploit the relationship. As Hobbes well recognized, the relationship begins 
to take on an identity of its own, which compels partners to give over some of their identity and 
autonomy as individuals to the whole, thereby allowing their identity as individuals to be shaped 
and defined, at least in part, by the relationship. For example, they begin to identify as a member 
of a family, clan, political unit and accept responsibilities they did not have when acting alone. 
 
As reciprocal relations develop, partners expect one another to understand what they de-
sire (what their values are) and realize themselves that they must understand their partner’s de-
sires. As the stability and reliability of the future of the relationship becomes more a matter of 
concern, a demand to increase the robustness of the arrangement arises, which in turn, demands 
greater mutual understanding and agreement on matters of values, beliefs and practices. Mutual 
understanding involves a development of modes of communication that are adequate to avoid 
misunderstanding. Once this happens, A and B recognize that they belong to a communicative 
community. Forming such a relationship, establishes a sense of mutual identity, as members of a 
single community. In this way, future oriented trade relationships involve a sense of collective 
identity and an awareness of potential collective harms. As a consequence, the original motiva-
tion of acting on pure self-interest eventually becomes a threat to both the group and to individ-
ual members. The concern over collective harm becomes important to the governance of the 
trade/exchange relationship in a way that matches or sometimes supercedes (as in times of war) 
the importance of individual harm. 
Collectivity, consequently, becomes a focus for economic development, as obligations 
and responsibilities to protect from harm (the harm principle) shift from the individual to the 
whole. Individuals begin to act on new kinds of moral value, when their actions serve to protect 
the community (not just themselves), help community members reach mutual understanding and 
help maintain stable community relations. Trade and exchange relationships then become more 
than just devices to enable individuals to prosper, but become devices that enable a moral econ-
omy to work, which in turn, enables a continuing exchange relationship to develop and flourish. 
My point is not to advance a collectivist socio-political model over an individualist one, 
but to expose the extent to which moral values and principles become entrenched in economic 
relationships, to the point where each serves the other. This entrenchment does not occur because 
some members impose the moral values onto the relationship, but because they co-evolve; they 
belong to a context of inter-dependent arising, where the economic relationship provides impetus 
for the moral relationship and the moral relationship enables the economic relationship to de-
velop into a communal relationship of mutual provision/protection. 
If this analysis is correct, inter-dependent arising implies that all future oriented eco-
nomic relations involve deep-seated normative forces that maintain the viability of other eco-
nomic relations. Indeed, the two are different faces of the same head. On the one hand, then, it is 
doubtful that moral values and principles would have ever come to be, if not for economic rela-
tions. On the other hand, economic relations would not have evolved into much more than imme-
diate, one time interactions, apart from the potential for human beings to be directed by norma-
tive forces. 
 
Where then is the mistake in the dominant assumptions of economics. Obviously, on the 
surface it lies in treating ethics and economics as externally related. Taking the idea further, 
however, it can now be seen in the failure to appreciate the full extent of the evolutionary charac-
ter of economic systems and the belief that initial interests can remain as they first operated, once 
subject to evolutionary forces. A second mistake is the conception of economics purely as a sci-
ence, as opposed to a normative discipline. This conception is an attempt to strip economics of 
an essential defining characteristic, a forced redefinition of economics as a quantitative science, 
similar to the attempt at re-defining philosophy by the logical positivists as a follower of science, 
in which metaphysics and ethics would be recognized as mere historical curiosities. Re-
embedding ethics and economics, then, is more a matter of identifying and removing forced re-
conceptions and definitions, than it is a matter of working ethics back into economics. 
 
Obviously, I can only briefly sketch what some of the operations of re-embedding would 
be. At a fairly fundamental level, owing to the inclusion of a complex array of values (central 
ones of which are moral) and expectations, re-embedding would involve developing a more com-
prehensive understanding of the underlying value system and resisting simplification and reduc-
tion tendencies. We need to understand how the various modes of exchange work together to 
form communities and then what measures need to be taken to protect that community, ensuring 
that emphasis of one mode of exchange does not undermine the other. In this effort, people’s 






By failing to be maintain an attunement to the inter-dependent arising of the moral and 
trade economy by simplifying terms of reference distorts our understanding of what makes eco-
nomic systems work frame of reference. When the primary frame of reference for policy and de-
cision-making, this simplification/distortion contributes to the undermining of the raison d’être 
for the economic system. It undermines its ability to protect the community from the harms 
(various forms of suffering) it was intended to relieve. For instance, if trust is a vital element of 
social exchange that maintains social cohesion and an ability to ... and an economic focus on ma-
teriality and quantifiability devalue or even ignore such elements, then, policy and decision-
makers will fail to respect what they are taking for granted. And when we ignore the centrality of 
trust, we also ignore the conditions that support it and those that can undermine it. Recently, we 
have seen just how fragile an undermining of trust might be, as world leaders have struggled to 
avoid a massive economic collapse. They have had to get people not to protect their individual 
wealth by saving (not spending) and to utilize various spending and investment incentives. This 
all on money that governments do not have. They, therefore, depend on their citizens believing 
that their governments’ policies will work, in the end, to bring the economy to a robust state. But 
even here, governments have relied on trust of the community. If trust had disintegrated, the 
world economy would have spun into depression. The violence shown toward bankers and gov-
ernments would likely have been accelerated.  
It is fitting that Alan Greenspan (Chairman of the Federal Reserve, 1987-2006) at a 2008 
Congressional hearing has admitted that he did not understand how the world worked, because of 
the particular ideology he held (i.e., the belief in a self-regulating market economy). Clearly, I 
want to argue that his mistake runs more deeply, but it is sufficient here to point out that a mis-
taken believe in how the world actually works can lead to disaster. The question then arises, 
“How deeply and comprehensively does one have to understand how the world works to be able 
to make decisions that do not?”  
 
Addendum 
Perhaps, a fully satisfactory answer is not possible, given the complexity of the world. 
But perhaps like Socrates, once we establish that a particular path is not going to work, a new 
attempt must be made. And if we understand that the problem has much to do with simplification 
and reduction to quantifiable variables, the appropriate turn would be toward an approach that 
would enable a more complex understanding to be developed. If my analysis of the ethics/
economics relationship is correct, then a more adequate approach would first be to re-frame eco-
nomics and ethics as an inter-dependent arising. Our principal task would be to attune ourselves, 
as much as possible, to the full array of values and resist resorting to short-cut measures (e.g., the 
invisible hand) as a way to deal with them. More specifically, we can begin to re-focus on devel-
oping a sense of community, where the fostering of trust remains central. 
 
 
If we accept that the detaching of ethics from economics stems from modernist influences, then it 
might be tempting to argue from a Straussian point of view that we must return  to pre-modern 
conceptions of the relationship. This approach would not serve us well. In many respects, the pre
-moderns were not self-consciously aware of the need to embed ethics and economics; for the 
Ancients, the embeddedness of these elements was part of an assumed (implicit) backdrop of 
ideas and sensibilities (what Habermas calls “??). The ancient conceptual framework, epistemol-
ogy and cosmology, sustained through the authority of the church, enabled people to assume the 
inter-connectedness of all functions and reality, as products of the will of God or emanations of 
the Good.  
 
